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The Politics of Compromise†
By Alessandro Bonatti and Heikki Rantakari*
An organization must select among competing projects that differ 
in their payoff consequences for its members. Each agent chooses 
a project and exerts effort affecting its completion time. When one 
or more projects are complete, the agents select which one to adopt. 
The selection rule for multiple projects that maximizes ex post 
welfare leads to inefficiently high polarization; rules that favor later 
proposals improve upon ex post optimal selections. The optimal 
degree of favoritism increases in the cost of effort and discount rate. 
This trade-off informs the design of process rules in standard-setting 
organizations and helps explain their performance. (JEL C78, D23, 
D71, D72, D83, L15)
Many organizations rely on their members to develop solutions to specific 
problems. Universities establish search committees to hire at the senior level or to 
recommend changes to the curriculum. In a very similar fashion, standards bod-
ies routinely form working groups to define the properties of a new technological 
standard. In both settings, there are no readily available solutions (i.e., candidates, 
curricula, standards) from which to select. Instead, the members of the organization 
must invest time and effort developing potential solutions. Furthermore, different 
members may have conflicting preferences over the feasible alternatives: which can-
didate to hire or which courses or patents to include in the curriculum or standard, 
respectively. Finally, as decision rights are typically shared, members must ulti-
mately come to an agreement over which proposed solution to adopt.
The following problem is at the heart of all these examples. Because developing 
a proposal is costly, the first agent who presents a concrete proposal acquires con-
siderable bargaining power. The other agents can avoid further development costs 
by approving his project and, hence, are willing to endorse projects that are not ideal 
from their perspective. When agents have conflicting preferences over  potential 
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 projects, this creates scope for rent-seeking behavior, i.e., agents exert effort to 
develop projects that are biased in their favor and to preempt others from presenting 
alternatives that they like much less.
The development of projects that are highly skewed toward one member or group 
can be detrimental to an organization if solutions that compromise among mem-
bers’ goals are more efficient.1 The challenge for the organization is then to provide 
members with incentives to develop moderate rather than highly polarized projects. 
However, the more a member is motivated to compromise on project selection, the 
less interested he is in the development of his own project, leading to inefficient 
effort and, hence, to inefficient delay.
In this paper, we are interested in the design of organizational decision-making 
processes that strike a balance between compromise in project choices and equi-
librium effort levels. We explore this trade-off in a dynamic model consisting of 
a development phase and an adoption phase. Loosely speaking, the development 
phase integrates the classic patent race and team production frameworks with a 
choice of “research direction.” Two agents continuously choose which project to 
pursue and how much effort to exert. Each project’s completion requires a single 
stochastic breakthrough, and each agent affects the probability distribution of its 
arrival time through costly effort. Agents have conflicting interests, and compro-
mise is efficient. In particular, there exists a continuum of potential projects that 
generate different payoffs for each agent, forming a strictly concave Pareto frontier. 
Therefore, “intermediate” or “compromise” projects are socially desirable.
Once a project is complete, the agents must decide whether to adopt it or wait 
until the second project is developed. While projects can be ranked in terms of their 
payoffs for the two agents, the space of their underlying characteristics can be quite 
complex. Therefore, we do not allow the agents to adopt convex combinations of 
projects with different characteristics. Further, we do not allow agents to write con-
tracts that condition payments or decision rights on the characteristics of the proj-
ects developed.2
The decision to adopt an agent’s project requires the acquiescence of the other 
agent. For example, if a member of a hiring committee finds a given candidate suf-
ficiently unattractive, he can delay the adoption decision and continue to search 
for an alternative candidate. A consensus requirement can thus limit the scope for 
rent-seeking and induce each agent to shift away from his ideal project to ensure the 
other agent’s support. However, a consensus requirement alone does not determine 
a particular level of compromise. In the hiring example, each committee member’s 
incentives to block or adopt the first candidate depend not only on the value of that 
candidate but also on which alternative candidates he prefers and which ones he 
expects to generate consensus. In other words, the option value of blocking a project 
depends on continuation play and, thus, on the selection rule dictating which project 
1 In the context of a business school, examples include senior faculty candidates who can interact with heteroge-
neous groups and core curricula for MBA students that are not dominated by one subject area. In the context of stan-
dardization, consider technological solutions that minimize the total switching costs faced by firms and consumers. 
2 The complexity of the projects suggests that it can be exceedingly difficult to describe them in a contract. 
Similarly, the existence of complementarities within a given project can make combining two distinct projects 
unprofitable, if not unfeasible. See Brynjolfsson and Milgrom (2013) for a discussion. Finally, while theoretically 
attractive, ex ante payments are often impractical, if not illegal, in many applications. We discuss this assumption 
within the context of standards-setting in greater detail in the next subsection and in Section VI. 
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is adopted when two projects have been developed. Solving backward, the selection 
rule influences the types of projects developed in equilibrium and their completion 
times.
Our main results are as follows. Under the selection rule that adopts the project 
with the highest ex post social value, the agents exert efficient effort levels condi-
tional on their chosen projects, but they pursue excessively polarized projects. In 
other words, we uncover a trade-off between ex post welfare and the incentives for 
compromise in the initial project choices. To improve ex ante welfare (i.e., the sum 
of the agents’ utilities) relative to the ex post optimal criterion, the selection rule 
must be distorted in favor of the project developed later. For instance, the selection 
rule can allow each agent to respond to the project that is developed first with a more 
polarized (and, hence, more selfish) project. This ex post distortion “levels the play-
ing field” by increasing the option value of blocking the first project, and it forces 
both agents to compromise more in their initial project choices.
The optimal (second-best) combination of projects and effort levels can be 
induced in equilibrium by adopting the project that maximizes a weighted sum of the 
agents’ payoffs. Consistent with the option value logic, the optimal Pareto weights 
are skewed in favor of the agent who develops the second project. Furthermore, as 
the agents’ costs of effort and discount rates increase, the option value of blocking 
the first project decreases, and the optimal degree of favoritism must consequently 
increase.
We finally consider how the model applies to standard-setting organizations. To 
capture some features of their environment, we consider a slightly modified setting 
in which voting and active agents coexist. Specifically, we introduce a continuum 
of voters with heterogeneous preferences over projects. A simple voting procedure 
implements the optimal combination of projects and effort levels: projects are voted 
on sequentially as they are completed; a qualified majority is required for approval; 
and any project that fails to gain approval is removed from further consideration. 
In particular, the ability to discard projects that have been voted down is neces-
sary to strike the balance between compromise and effort. Conversely, a procedure 
that saves voted-down projects for a tie-breaking “runoff ” vote leads to excessively 
polarized initial project choices.
This tension is reflected in the experiences of many standard-setting organiza-
tions, to which we now turn.
Standard-Setting Organizations. —We focus on the workings of voluntary stan-
dard-setting organizations (SSOs) as an application. This is a suitable application 
for three reasons: (i) economic relevance; (ii) the trade-off between free-riding and 
rent-seeking; and (iii) data availability. In particular, the inter-firm nature of SSOs 
facilitates finding evidence relative to intra-firm applications.3
Following Simcoe (2014, p. 103), we define an SSO as a “multilateral organi-
zation that governs some key piece of a shared technology platform.” SSOs pro-
vide forums (with voluntary participation) for the development and establishment 
3 From this perspective, the SSOs for the governance of the Internet are especially relevant for our model. These 
organizations include the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the Internet Engineering Task 
Force (IETF), and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). 
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of broad  consensus on standards prior to their adoption. Thus, the main economic 
advantage of SSOs is to solve the potential coordination failures that arise under 
unfettered market competition. In markets with network externalities, de jure stan-
dardization saves duplication costs, stimulates specific investments by complemen-
tary products, and avoids the risk of a standards war.
This process has been used to establish a multitude of voluntary consensus stan-
dards.4 However, shared interest in establishing a standard to realize the benefits 
of network economies often conflicts with the vested interests of each participant. 
Overall, the combination of free-riding, distributional conflicts, and consensus 
requirements makes reaching an agreement quite challenging. Consistent with our 
approach, Simcoe (2014) and Baron, Meniere, and Pohlmann (2014) argue that the 
process of developing and adopting a standard must balance free-rider problems and 
rent-seeking behaviors. In Section VI, we illustrate the decision-making procedures 
that SSOs use to manage each element of this trade-off.
Finally, ex ante contracting may alleviate many of the inefficiencies faced by 
SSOs, including those examined by our model. Recent theoretical work, e.g., Lerner 
and Tirole (2015), suggests ex ante price commitments as a means of improving 
efficiency, and some SSOs have taken steps toward such commitments. However, 
given that price negotiations open the door to litigation, most SSOs do not encour-
age price commitments, and some explicitly forbid firms from negotiating licensing 
agreements at the standard-setting stage.5 Consequently, we rule out ex ante trans-
fers. In the working paper version, Bonatti and Rantakari (2015), we allow agents 
to offer payments in exchange for support for their projects. We show that policy 
compromise remains a crucial means of building consensus even when money is 
available and that ex post transfers may, in fact, be detrimental to compromise.
Related Literature.—At a broad level, this paper is part of a growing literature 
adopting the political view of organizational decision-making initiated by March 
(1962) and Cyert and March (1963), which is summarized by Pfeffer (1981) as 
follows, “to understand organizational choices using a political model, it is nec-
essary to understand who participates in decision making, […] what determines 
each actor’s relative power, and how the decision process arrives at a decision.” See 
Gibbons, Matouschek, and Roberts (2013) for a survey.
At a more detailed level, this paper is related to several strands of more recent 
research. First, our model can be viewed as an analysis of real authority and project 
choice in organizations. The most closely related papers in this field are Aghion 
and Tirole (1997) and Rantakari (2012) in their focus on ex ante incentives and 
Armstrong and Vickers (2010) in their analysis of endogenous proposals.6
4 Examples of Internet-related standards adopted by the SSOs referenced above include the 802.11 standard for 
wireless communication in the IEEE, the HTTP protocol in the IETF, and the URL standard for the World Wide 
Web in the W3C. 
5 Llanes and Poblete (2014) note that in the IEEE “participants should never discuss the price at which compli-
ant products may or will be sold, or the specific licensing fees, terms, and conditions being offered by the owner 
of a potential Essential Patent Claim.” The European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI) has similar 
rules in place. 
6 Other papers have examined the impact of organizational structure on information flows inside the organiza-
tion. For instance, Dessein (2002); Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008); and Rantakari (2008) consider the 
impact of the allocation of decision rights on strategic communication and decision-making. 
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Second, our work ties into a large literature focused on conflict resolution within a 
committee. For instance, Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) and Che and Kartik (2009) 
analyze the value of conflict for information acquisition in committees. In contrast, 
we focus on the roles of ex ante conflict and ex post negotiation in achieving equi-
librium compromises on project choices. More closely related to our application are 
Farrell and Saloner (1988) and Farrell and Simcoe (2012), who study consensus 
decision-making in standard-setting organizations. In their setting, the organization 
must select one of two exogenously developed projects when information on proj-
ect quality is asymmetric and the decision structure is fixed.7 In contrast, in our 
model, the development phase precedes the adoption phase. The development phase 
is closely related to the R&D and patent race models of Reinganum (1982) and 
Doraszelski (2008). Relative to these papers, we integrate choices over research 
directions and negotiations over project adoption.
Third, our paper is related to the dynamic provision of public goods, e.g., Admati 
and Perry (1991) and Marx and Matthews (2000). In these models, as well as in 
ours, each agent conditions his contributions on the type of public good provided by 
the other agents. An innovative feature of our framework is that it allows agents to 
choose which type of public good they wish to provide.
Finally, our paper is part of a recent political economy literature on policy contests. 
Callander and Harstad (2015) develop a two-period model of policy experimenta-
tion along both horizontal (ideology) and vertical (effort or quantity) dimensions. 
In an application to federal systems, they compare decentralized decision-making to 
a regime of progressive centralization. Hirsch and Shotts (2015) consider a related 
(two-dimensional) static model of competing policy proposals with a fixed decision 
structure.
I. Model
We model an organization consisting of two agents  i = 1, 2 . There exists a con-
tinuum of feasible projects indexed by  x ∈ [ 0, 1 ] . For a project to yield payoffs to 
the agents, it must be first developed and then adopted, as described below.
Time is continuous, and the horizon is infinite. Both agents are impatient and 
discount the future at rate  r . To develop a project, agents exert costly effort. The 
development (or “completion”) of each project is stochastic and requires the arrival 
of a single breakthrough that follows a Poisson process: if agent  i were to choose 
a constant project  x i and exert a constant effort  a i over some time interval d  t , then 
the delay until the development of project  x i would be distributed exponentially 
over that time interval with parameter  λ  a i . Without loss of generality, we normal-
ize  λ to one. For tractability, the instantaneous cost to agent  i of exerting effort 
 a i ∈  ℝ + is independent of the project chosen. It is given by  c i ( a i ) =  c i ·  a i 2 /2 for 
some constant  c i > 0 .
The chosen projects and effort levels are assumed to be noncontractible and unob-
servable to the other player. Once a project has been developed, it can be adopted. 
The selection of a project is irreversible and ends the game. We analyze various 
7 Simcoe (2012) estimates a complete-information, stochastic model of bargaining by exploiting variation in the 
nature of the projects submitted to the IETF. The decision structure is then fixed by construction. 
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procedures for selecting the project that is, in fact, adopted. In all of our settings, 
an outcome of the game consists of (i) the measurable functions  a i :  ℝ + →  ℝ + 
and  x i :  ℝ + → [ 0, 1 ] , where  a i, t is the level of effort exerted by  i at time  t toward 
the development of project  x i, t ; (ii) the set of projects  x i, τ developed by either agent 
i at any time  τ ; and (iii) at most one project  x i, τ adopted at time  τ ′ ≥ τ .
We also assume that each agent can freely modify his choice of project  x i, t during 
the game, that each agent  i can develop at most one project and that the development 
of any project is publicly observable. We discuss these assumptions in Section V.
Adoption of project  x yields a net present value of  v i (x) for each agent  i . As long 
as no project has been adopted, agents reap no benefits from any project. If project 
x is adopted at time  τ , the discounted payoff to agent  i is given by
(1)  V i =  e −r τ  v i (x) −  ∫ 0 τ  e −r t  c i ( a i, t ) dt. 
The payoff functions  v i (x) are monotone, differentiable, and strictly concave. 
In particular,  v 1 (x) is increasing, and  v 2 (x) is decreasing, with  v 1 (1) =  v 2 (0) = 1 
and  v 1 (0) =  v 2 (1) = 0 . Thus, agents have conflicting preferences over projects: 
x = 1 is agent 1’s preferred project and  x = 0 is agent 2’s preferred project. 
Moreover, compromise is efficient: the agents’ payoffs  ( v 1 (x),  v 2 (x)) form a contin-
uously differentiable and strictly concave payoff frontier. We maintain the following 
assumptions throughout the paper.
ASSUMPTION 1 (Symmetry):
 (i) The agents’ cost functions are identical, i.e.,  c 1 =  c 2 = c .
 (ii) The payoff frontier is symmetric, i.e., for all  x ∈  [0, 1] ,
  v 1 (x) =  v 2 (1 − x) . 
The costs associated with developing a project, i.e., the delay itself and the cost of 
effort incurred during that delay, can often be summarized by the effective discount 
rate
  ρ ≜ c · r. 
Under Assumption 1, we denote the payoff frontier as a strictly decreasing and 
strictly concave function  v j = ϕ ( v i ) . Figure 1 provides an illustration.
The development phase is followed by an adoption phase. In the adoption phase, 
once one or more projects have been developed, negotiations to select which one 
is adopted take place. Adoption decisions require consensus, i.e., both agents must 
agree to adopt a project. More formally, suppose that agent 1 developed the first 
project  x 1 at time  τ . Agent 2 can choose to adopt agent 1’s project at any time  t ≥ τ . 
As long as no project has been adopted, agent  2 can attempt to develop a different 
project  x 2 , i.e., agent 2 can de facto veto agent 1’s initial project by delaying its 
adoption until he has developed a competing project.
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Naturally, the incentives to adopt or to veto a project depend on the outcome that 
agent 2 expects once he has developed his own project. We must then understand 
how negotiations unfold in the subgame that begins once two projects  x 1 and  x 2 have 
been developed. Our model seeks to capture two crucial aspects of the bargaining 
process: (i) agents are able to condition their play on the public history prior to the 
adoption phase, and (ii) because developed projects are publicly observable, each 
agent  i can anticipate the outcome of the adoption phase as a function of which 
project is developed at which time. We would like our approach to be insensitive to 
the details of the bargaining process. Thus, we do not analyze a specific extensive 
form game. Instead, we follow the approach to (re)negotiation introduced by Tirole 
(1986) in the context of procurement, i.e., we posit a selection function
(2)  ξ(x, τ) ∈ {  x 1 ,  x 2 } 
that indicates which project is adopted if  x =  ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) were developed at 
 τ =  ( τ 1 ,  τ 2 ) .
With this formulation, we are focusing on deterministic, ex post Pareto-efficient 
selection functions, i.e., a project is adopted immediately with probability one. As 
an illustration, suppose that negotiations unfold as a complete information war of 
attrition in continuous time: each agent  i can “concede” at any time, leading to the 
adoption of project  x j . Under this protocol,  ξ(x, τ) =  x i selects the Pareto-efficient 
equilibrium in which agent  j concedes immediately. The war of attrition and other 
bargaining games also admit inefficient equilibria, such as those with costly delays 
0
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Figure 1. Project Possibilities Frontier
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characterized by Hendricks, Weiss, and Wilson (1988). In Section V, we discuss 
other selection functions.
II. Benchmark Projects
Before analyzing the full model, we consider a benchmark model with the fol-
lowing characteristics: each agent  i works on an exogenously given project  x i , the 
first project to be developed is adopted immediately, and effort levels are chosen 
noncooperatively. The goal of this section is twofold: to derive how the equilibrium 
effort levels depend on the project characteristics  ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) , which is instrumental to 
characterizing on-path effort when projects are endogenously chosen, and to iden-
tify the second-best projects  ( x 1 ∗ ,  x 2 ∗) that would be developed if agents could con-
tract ex ante on project characteristics. We describe our results informally and refer 
the reader to Bonatti and Rantakari (2015) (henceforth, the working paper) for the 
details.
Given projects  ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) , each agent  i chooses a measurable function  a i :  ℝ + →  ℝ + 
to maximize his expected discounted payoff  V i, 0 . Because the hazard rate of the first 
breakthrough is given by  a 1, t +  a 2, t , each agent’s expected payoff at time  t = 0 is 
given by
(3)  V i, 0 =  ∫ 0 ∞  e − ∫ 0 t(r+ a 1, s + a 2, s ) ds ( a i, t  v i ( x i ) +  a j, t  v i ( x j ) − c ( a i, t ) ) dt. 
This game has a unique Nash equilibrium for any pair of projects  ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) such 
that each agent prefers his own project to the other agent’s, i.e.,  x 1 >  x 2 . (This is the 
relevant range for the benchmark projects described below.) In equilibrium, agents 
use stationary strategies, i.e., constant effort levels  a i, t =  a i . In the case of sym-
metric projects, i.e.,  x 2 = 1 −  x 1 , this equilibrium is also symmetric, and the equi-
librium effort level depends negatively on  c and positively on the distance  x 1 −  x 2 , 
on the value of each agent’s own project  v i ( x i ) , and on the discount rate  r . Finally, 
if  x 1 <  x 2 and the projects are symmetric, the game has a unique symmetric equilib-
rium with these same properties.8 When we endogenize the agents’ project choice, 
we consider stationary effort strategies without loss of generality.
Each agent increases the probability of achieving a breakthrough by exerting 
more effort. Agent  i ’s incentives at time  t are then driven by the value of ending 
the game with a payoff of  v i ( x i ) . Under stationary strategies, we can write agent  i ’s 
problem recursively as
(4)  r V i =  max  a i  
  [ a i ( v i ( x i ) −  V i ) +  a j ( v i ( x j ) −  V i ) − c a i 2 / 2] . 
Each agent’s first-order condition relates the incentives for effort to the gains from 
developing his own project over and above his continuation value:
(5)  c a i ∗ =  v i ( x i ) −  V i . 
8 When each agent prefers his opponent’s project to his own, i.e.,  x 1 <  x 2 , multiple stationary and  nonstationary 
equilibria may exist due to an extreme free-rider problem in the provision of effort. 
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Formulation (4) suggests that agent  j ’s effort may impose a positive or negative 
externality on agent  i , depending on whether the payoff of agent  i from his oppo-
nent’s project  v i ( x j ) is higher or lower than his own continuation value  V i . Intuitively, 
agent  j ’s effort has two effects on agent  i ’s payoff: on the one hand, agent  j is more 
likely to generate positive benefits  v i ( x j ) for agent  i and allow him to save on further 
development costs; on the other hand, agent  i is now less likely to realize the bene-
fits  v i ( x i ) that accrue from developing his project first.
The characteristics of the two projects  x 1 and  x 2 determine the nature of the exter-
nality that each player’s actions impose on the other player. In particular, when 
the two projects are sufficiently different, agent  j ’s effort imposes a negative exter-
nality on agent  i . Suppose, for example, that the agents pursue their favorite proj-
ects  x 1 = 1 and  x 2 = 0 . Agent  2 ’s effort imposes a negative externality on agent  1 
because the payoff  v 1 (0) = 0 falls short of the equilibrium continuation value  V 1 , 
which is strictly positive because agent  1 has a positive probability of developing 
and adopting his own project  x 1 . The opposite holds when the two projects are very 
similar and  v 1 ( x 1 ) ≈  v 1 ( x 2 ) . In this case, the payoff  v 1 ( x 2 ) exceeds the continuation 
value  V 1 , which accounts for costly effort and delay.
An increase in agent  j ’s effort may then either motivate or discourage high effort 
levels by agent  i . Specifically, the nature of the payoff externality imposed by one 
agent’s effort on the other agent also determines whether the game has the strategic 
properties of a patent race, where the agents want to preempt each other by working 
harder, or of a moral hazard in teams problem, where the agents have an incentive 
to free ride. Consequently, the effort levels in the noncooperative solution may be 
above or below the levels that would maximize the agents’ joint surplus.9 Figure 2 
illustrates the free-riding and racing regions for two different values of  ρ as well as 
the benchmark projects described below.
If both the effort levels and the project characteristics were contractible, then 
the first-best solution would have each agent develop project  x = 1/2 and choose 
first-best effort levels. However, as discussed above, when the effort levels are 
 noncontractible, pursuing these projects yields inefficiently low effort levels. For 
any pair of symmetric projects, i.e.,  x 1 = 1 −  x 2 , we refer to the value  v j ( x  i ) that 
each agent’s project generates for the other agent as the degree of compromise. We 
now characterize two pairs of benchmark projects.
Efficient-Effort Projects.—There exists a unique pair of projects  ( x 1 E ,  x 2 E ) that 
yield the first-best effort levels, i.e., the levels that maximize the agents’ joint sur-
plus, conditional on the projects pursued. The efficient-effort projects satisfy
(6)  v i  ( x j E ) =  V i  ( x i E ,  x j E ) . 
In other words, under efficient-effort projects, each agent  i is indifferent between 
receiving the payoff from agent  j ’s completed project  v i ( x j ) and continuing the game 
with an expected value  V i ( x i ,  x j ) . Thus, agent  i is indifferent to whether  j develops 
his project. Additionally, because agent  j ’s choice of effort  a j then affects his own 
9 Beath, Katsoulacos, and Ulph (1989) and Doraszelski (2008) obtain analogous results for R&D races with 
imperfect patent protection. 
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payoff only, it is efficient. Moreover, if  x 1 −  x 2 >  x 1 E −  x 2 E , effort levels are strate-
gic complements, and the equilibrium effort levels are inefficiently high; inversely, 
if  x 1 −  x 2 <  x 1 E −  x 2 E , effort levels are strategic substitutes and inefficiently low in 
equilibrium. As either the discount rate  r or the cost of effort  c increases, the pay-
off distance between the two projects  x 1 E and  x 2 E increases, i.e., agents’ efforts are 
strategic substitutes for a wider choice of projects. If an agent is very impatient or 
finds effort to be very costly, he is more likely to benefit from the other agent devel-
oping his project and hence to free ride on the other agent’s effort. As either  c or 
r grows without bound, equation (6) implies  v i  ( x j E ) → 0 , meaning that  x 1 E → 1 
and  x 2 E → 0 .
While projects  x 1 E and  x 2 E elicit efficient effort levels, they do not maximize the 
agents’ ex ante payoffs. Starting from the efficient effort levels, inducing a higher 
degree of compromise entails a second-order loss due to reduced effort but a 
 first-order gain due to the increased social value of the adopted project.
Second-Best Projects.—There exists a unique pair of projects  ( x 1 ∗ ,  x 2 ∗) that max-
imize the ex ante sum of the agents’ utilities  V 1, 0 +  V 2, 0 when effort levels are 
 chosen noncooperatively and the first project is adopted.10 The second-best projects 
 x 1 ∗ and  x 2 ∗ are symmetric, and they trade-off the expected cost of delay and the total 
value of the adopted projects. More formally, the sum of the agents’ payoffs is 
 quasiconcave in the degree of compromise with a single peak at  ( x 1 ∗ ,  x 2 ∗) .
10 Throughout the paper, we adopt the utilitarian criterion to assess welfare. Even if decisions in the model are 
not contractible (because we have ruled out monetary transfers ex post), it is sufficient that agents be able to contract 
on process rules for the ex ante choice of decision structure to be guided by the utilitarian criterion. Finally, maxi-
mizing the sum of the agents’ utilities is a simple second-best goal for the organization. Murphy and Yates (2009, 
p. 16) note that the utilitarian criterion is cited as part of the International Standards Organization (ISO) mission 
statement: “to unify the needs of industry and thus bring about the greatest good for the greatest number.” 
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The second-best projects  x 1 ∗ and  x 2 ∗ induce a game of strategic substitutes with 
equilibrium effort levels below the first best. In other words, the distance between 
the second-best projects satisfies  x 1 ∗ −  x 2 ∗ <  x 1 E −  x 2 E for any positive marginal cost 
and discount rate.11 While the second-best projects always lie in the region of stra-
tegic substitutes, the exact characteristics of these projects depend on the discount 
rate and the cost of effort. As either  c or  r increases, the second-best projects become 
more distant because a higher degree of conflict stimulates effort when the develop-
ment of a project is more urgent or more costly. However, in the limit, and in con-
trast to efficient-effort projects, second-best projects do not approach  (0, 1) ; even as 
the agents become arbitrarily impatient or inefficient, it is always optimal to induce 
some positive degree of compromise.
Finally, one may wonder whether the sum of ex ante payoffs could be improved 
by relaxing the assumption that agents pursue the second-best projects at all times 
and the first project completed is immediately adopted. We therefore consider arbi-
trary paths  ( x 1, t ,  x 2, t ) and more general adoption rules that allow for deadlines, 
delays, and other distortions. The optimal mechanism in this class is quite simple.
LEMMA 1 (Optimal Mechanism): In the optimal symmetric mechanism, agents 
pursue the second-best projects  x i ∗ at all  t ≥ 0 , and the first project developed is 
adopted immediately.
Intuitively, expected payoffs can only be improved relative to pursuing the 
 second-best projects by inducing higher effort levels at the early stages of the game. 
This can be achieved by distorting future project and adoption choices. However, as 
(5) makes clear, increasing effort requires lowering continuation payoffs (pursuing 
less valuable projects). This tension between payoffs and incentives prevents ex post 
distortions from improving upon the best stationary mechanism.
III. Equilibrium Project Selection
When project choice is not contractible, agents choose which projects to pursue 
based on their expectations of how the game will unfold when one or both projects 
have been completed. If only agent  j has completed his project, the outcome is deter-
mined by agent  i ’s choice to either accept the proposal or continue his development 
efforts, given the expected payoff of continued development. The expectation over 
the outcome of the negotiations with two complete projects is, in turn, captured by 
the selection function  ξ (x, τ) .
We must then compute agent  i ’s expected value from continuing the game. In 
particular, agent  i can choose a new project  x i ′ after agent  j develops project  x j , even 
if agent  i had previously been pursuing project  x i . However, developing his own 
project is costly for agent  i in terms of both effort and time. Thus, agent  i adopts 
project  x j immediately if and only if its value  v i ( x j ) exceeds his continuation value 
under the selection function.
11 As the agents become arbitrarily patient or efficient, both  x i E and  x i ∗ converge to  1/2 . 
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We will refer to this continuation value as the option value of blocking the first 
project. The option value is crucially determined by the set of projects that agent  j 
can expect to develop and has adopted. In particular, let  u (w)  denote the value that 
an agent assigns to earning  0 ≤ w ≤ 1 upon the development of his project. This 
value is given by
(7)  u (w) ≜  max  a i, t     ∫ 0 ∞  e − ∫ 0 t(r+ a i, s ) ds ( a i, t w − c a i, t 2 /2) dt = w + ρ −  √ _ ρ 2 + 2wρ . 
Solving backward, both agents have an incentive to engage in preemptive com-
promise: by proposing a project that is sufficiently attractive to the other agent, the 
first agent is able to guarantee immediate adoption. This avoids a deadlock wherein 
the second agent develops his own project and then negotiations take place over the 
two proposed alternatives. The remainder of this section analyzes how the agents’ 
project choice is influenced by the selection function (and thus by the option value 
of blocking) and the conditions under which it is possible to induce the agents to 
pursue second-best projects.
A. Ex Post Optimal Selection
We begin our analysis by considering an intuitive setting wherein the agents select 
the more socially valuable project whenever two projects have been developed. Ties 
are broken in favor of the project developed later to ensure the existence of a best 
response once one project has been developed.
We define the ex post optimal selection function as follows: let  ξ(x, τ) =  x 1 
if  Σ i  v i ( x 1 ) >  Σ i  v i ( x 2 ) or  Σ i  v i ( x 1 ) =  Σ i  v i ( x 2 ) and  τ 1 >  τ 2 . The ex post optimal 
selection function can be easily implemented, e.g., through an impartial mediator. 
We now show how this selection function determines the option value of blocking 
a project and, thus, the degree of compromise in the initial project necessary to 
achieve immediate acceptance.
Suppose that agent  1 completes project  x 1 > 1 / 2 . To prevail in the adoption 
phase, agent  2 must develop a project  x 2 that gives the sum of the agents at least as 
much as under the standing project  x 1 . With this continuation play, the best project 
agent  2 can develop and adopt is  x 2 = 1 −  x 1 , i.e., a project that yields the same 
level of total surplus as  x 1 and grants agent  2 exactly as much as agent  1 would 
receive under the original project  x 1 . Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium outcome 
under the ex post optimal selection function.
However, developing the second project is costly for agent  2 , and thus, he is 
willing to accept projects that yield less than  v 2 ( x 2 ) . More generally, each agent  i 
immediately adopts any project  x j that satisfies
(8)  v i ( x j ) ≥ u ( v i (1 −  x j ) ) , 
where the value of the single-agent problem  u ( · ) is defined in (7). Intuitively, each 
agent  j initially chooses to pursue a project that makes agent  i ’s acceptance con-
straint (8) bind. Proposition 1 characterizes the projects developed in equilibrium.
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PROPOSITION 1 (Ex Post Optimal Selection): The ex post optimal selection func-
tion yields a unique equilibrium outcome. Agents develop the efficient-effort projects 
( x 1 E ,  x 2 E ) , and the first project is immediately adopted.
PROOF:
Suppose that agent  1 develops the first project  x 1 , where  v 1 ( x 1 ) =  v 1 . Agent  2 
will adopt it if and only if his option value of developing the second project is less 
than  ϕ ( v 1 ) . If he decides to reject it, he will develop a project  x 2 = 1 −  x 1 . By back-
ward induction, agent  1 will develop a project  x 1 such that agent  2 is just indifferent 
between adopting it and rejecting it: any project that yields a higher value  v 1 will 
be rejected, and any project that yields a higher value  v 2 will be adopted but yields 
a strictly lower payoff to agent  1 . Therefore, the first project to be developed on the 
equilibrium path is adopted immediately. Furthermore, agent  i ’s initial project  x i 
coincides with the competing project  1 −  x j he could develop and successfully adopt 
in response to agent  j developing project  x j . Thus, agent  i receives from agent  j ’s 
project  x j a payoff  v i ( x j ) equal to his continuation value  V i (  x i ,  x j ) . As we argued 
in condition (6) above, this characterizes the unique level  x j that imposes neither 
 positive nor negative externalities in effort, so it is exactly  x j E . ∎
The natural selection function that adopts the best available project thus  highlights 
a tension between the value of the projects adopted ex post and the incentives for 
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ex ante compromise: if the organization insists on the ex post optimal selection, the 
alternatives that are generated will exhibit excessive polarization.
B. Ex Ante Optimal Selection
The development of the second-best projects along the equilibrium path must 
then be supported by the selection of the less socially valuable project (or other 
forms of ex post value burning) off the equilibrium path. In particular, the selection 
function must sufficiently favor the agent with the later project to discipline both 
agents’ initial project choices.
An extreme level of favoritism allows each agent  j to “counter” the initial proj-
ect  x i with his most preferred project (worth zero to agent  i ) and have it adopted. 
We shall refer to this case as second-mover authority. Then, to be adopted by agent 
j , each agent  i must develop an initial project  x i that yields to agent  j at least  u (1) . 
We define the project  x ̅i such that  v j ( x ̅i ) = u (1) as agent  i ’s maximum-compromise 
project. Because the value of the single-agent problem in (7) is strictly decreasing in 
ρ , the value of each agent’s own maximum-compromise project  v i ( x ̅i (ρ) ) is strictly 
increasing in  ρ and goes to  1 in the limit.
We now introduce a class of simple selection functions that incorporates ex post 
optimal selection and second-mover authority. Consider selection functions that 
maximize a weighted sum of the two agents’ payoffs, where  α ∈  [0, 1] denotes the 
weight assigned to the agent who develops the first project. Thus, if agent  1 develops 
the first project, the weighted-utilitarian selection function  ξ (x, τ, α) adopts proj-
ect  x 1 if
  α v 1 ( x 1 ) +  (1 − α)  v 2 ( x 1 ) > α v 1 ( x 2 ) +  (1 − α)  v 2 ( x 2 ) , 
and  x 2 otherwise. (Ties are again broken in favor of the second project.) Within 
this class,  α = 1/2 yields the ex post optimal selection and  α = 0 yields sec-
ond-mover authority.
Intuitively, the more costly the development and the more impatient the agent, the 
lower the option value of blocking and the less the first agent needs to compromise 
to induce acceptance. We define the threshold  ρ ̅ > 0 as the (unique) discount rate 
for which the second-best and maximum-compromise projects coincide, i.e.,
(9)  x i ∗ ( ρ ̅) =  x ̅i ( ρ ̅) . 
We now restrict our attention to the case of  ρ ≤  ρ ̅. In other words, we assume that 
the second-best projects are more polarized than the maximum-compromise proj-
ects, i.e.,  v i ( x ̅i ) ≤  v i ( x i ∗ ) . We discuss the case where  ρ >  ρ ̅ informally at the end of 
this section, and we characterize the equilibrium payoff set for any  ρ in the working 
paper.
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PROPOSITION 2 (Weighted-Utilitarian Selection):
 (i) The selection function  ξ(x, τ, α ) yields a unique symmetric equilibrium out-
come. Agent  i develops project  x i (α, ρ) , and the first completed project is 
immediately adopted.
 (ii) The degree of compromise  v j ( x i (α, ρ) ) is decreasing in  α (weakly) and in  ρ (strictly).
 (iii) There exists  α ̅ (ρ) ∈  (0, 1/2) such that agents develop the maximum- 
compromise projects  x ̅i (ρ) if and only if  α ≤  α ̅ (ρ) .
 (iv) There exists a unique  α ∗ (ρ) ∈  [ α ̅ (ρ) , 1/2] that induces the second-best 
 projects  x i ∗ (ρ) . The weight  α ∗ (ρ) is decreasing in  ρ , with  α ∗ (0) = 1/2 
and  α ∗ ( ρ ̅) =  α ̅ ( ρ ̅) .
The results in Proposition 2 reflect the logic of option values: the more an agent 
expects to earn from the adoption phase with two projects on the table, the more the 
other agent’s project must compromise to ensure immediate adoption. As illustrated 
in panel A of Figure 4 (and as discussed above), under the ex post optimal selection 
function  (α = 1/2) , each agent  j can develop and adopt his current project  x j E in 
response to agent  i ’s equilibrium project  x i E . With weights  α < 1/2, each agent can 
switch to a more polarized project after the first equilibrium project is developed, 
increasing the option value of blocking. Both agents must then choose initial proj-
ects with a higher degree of compromise.
The equilibrium degree of compromise is increasing in the weight placed on the 
second agent’s payoff. For sufficiently small  α , the second agent is able to pursue and 
adopt his favorite project. Thus, all  α ≤  α ̅ are equivalent to second-mover author-
ity and induce the agents to initially pursue the maximum-compromise project. The 
degree of compromise is also decreasing in the effective discount rate  ρ . Intuitively, 
as the agents become more impatient or the cost of development increases, they are 
willing to accept increasingly less attractive projects to avoid the costs of continued 
development efforts.
Finally, there exists an optimal weight  α ∗ (ρ) that supports the second-best proj-
ects. Consistent with the result in part (2.), the optimal selection function must 
favor the agent with the later project to increase the degree of compromise above 
 v j  ( x i E ) . Further, the optimal degree of favoritism increases with the effective discount 
rate. Intuitively, as the agents become more willing to acquiesce, their option value 
must increase to maintain the incentive to compromise. Thus,  α ∗ is decreasing in  ρ , 
despite the fact that second-best projects become more polarized as  ρ  increases.12 
These equilibrium levels of compromise are illustrated in panel B of Figure 4.
Different selection functions, including stochastic or ex post inefficient ones, can 
also implement the second-best projects. One such function randomizes ex post, 
adopting the project that was completed first with probability  α . While the value of 
12 Conversely, the option value  u (1; ρ) decreases sufficiently rapidly with  ρ that the maximum-compromise 
projects are supported by a wider range of  α , i.e., the threshold  α ̅ (ρ)  is increasing in  ρ . 
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the optimal  α ∗ will differ from the weighted-utilitarian case, both selection func-
tions generate the correct level of the option value on the equilibrium path.
However, no selection function can yield a higher degree of compromise than the 
second-mover authority. More generally, Pareto-inefficient or stochastic selection 
functions cannot enlarge the set of projects supported in equilibrium.13 This is a 
consequence of the agents’ lack of commitment: each agent can always adopt the 
other agent’s project when it is completed, and the selection function only governs 
equilibrium behavior when two projects are complete. Because the option value of 
developing a second project is bounded by  u (1) , no agent  i develops a project  x i 
with  v i ( x i ) <  v i ( x ̅i ) as part of an equilibrium outcome. Therefore, only projects ( x 1 ,  x 2 ) ranging from “purely selfish”  (1, 0) to maximum compromise  ( x ̅1 ,  x ̅2 ) can 
be supported in equilibrium. By a similar logic, the second-best projects are not 
attainable with any selection function when the effective discount rate  ρ exceeds the 
threshold  ρ ̅ defined in (9) above.
IV. Implementation through Voting
If agents can commit to decision-making procedures, they can implement the 
optimal decision rule in several ways. In the working paper, we explore a protocol 
wherein either agent can adopt the first complete project or permanently eliminate 
it, in which case he faces an exogenous deadline to develop his own. The correct 
deadline uniquely implements the optimal mechanism. Moreover, this procedure 
13 For instance, suppose that negotiations with two complete projects unfold as in the mixed-strategy equilib-
rium of a war of attrition. Then, each agent’s option value of developing the second project is equal to the value 
of adopting the first project (less the costs of additional effort and delay). This leads to the immediate adoption of 
any project and, therefore, to the development of each agent’s favorite project on the equilibrium path, i.e.,  x 1 = 1 
and  x 2 = 0 . However, this outcome can already be achieved with a (Pareto-efficient) selection function  (α = 1) 
described above. 
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may be appealing in settings with a small number of relevant participants, such as 
university hiring committees or research joint ventures.14
SSOs, in contrast, encourage broad participation, and proposals are voted on by 
participants who are not linked to a specific project. With this context in mind, we 
describe a setting in which actively participating agents (“firms”) and simply vot-
ing agents (“users”) coexist and how voting rules influence the equilibrium project 
choices.
Consider a continuum of users of mass one, whose types  θ are distributed on [0, 1] according to some continuous and symmetric density  f  (θ) . A user of type  θ 
derives value  w (Δ (θ, x) ) if project  x is adopted, where  Δ (θ, x) ≜  |θ − x|  is the 
distance of the project from the user’s ideal project and  w is a strictly decreasing and 
concave function. The two firms have identical preferences to those of the potential 
users. Their types are given by  θ 2 = 0 and  θ 1 = 1 , representing the two extremes 
of the preference spectrum.15
The timing of the game is similar to that of the baseline model: each firm chooses 
a project to work on; upon completion of the first project, the second firm can decide 
whether to “endorse” the project, ending the game with its adoption;16 if the second 
firm does not endorse, the first firm calls for a vote on whether its project should be 
adopted, and the voting rule requires that a qualified majority  γ ≥ 1/2 vote in favor 
for it to be adopted.
If the first complete project is rejected by the voters, two alternative procedures 
are especially relevant for our application to SSOs. In the first, the rejected project is 
removed from further consideration. The second firm can continue its development 
efforts until its project is complete, at which point a binary vote is held between the 
second project and the status quo (which is worth zero to all agents). In the second, 
the rejected project is set aside until the second project is complete, after which a 
binary “runoff” vote determines which alternative is adopted. Proposition 3 summa-
rizes the key properties of the equilibrium outcome, restricting attention to the case 
when  ρ ≤  ρ ̅.
PROPOSITION 3 (Voting and Equilibrium Compromise):
 (i) Under either voting procedure, any supermajority requirement  γ ≥ 1/2 
induces a unique equilibrium outcome in which the first project developed is 
immediately adopted.
 (ii) If  γ ∈  [1/2,  γ _ (ρ) ] , each firm develops its favorite project. The threshold 
 γ _ (ρ) is increasing in  ρ with  γ _ (0) = 1/2 and  lim ρ→∞   γ _ (ρ) = 1 .
14 In the hiring example, it prescribes that the committee loses the hiring slot if a member vetoes a candidate 
and fails to suggest an alternative candidate in a reasonable time. Note, however, that imposing a fixed deadline for 
filling the slot is never optimal. This follows from Lemma 1 and differentiates our result from Bonatti and Hörner 
(2011) and Campbell, Ederer, and Spinnewijn (2014). 
15 As we show in the online Appendix, the logic of our results generalizes to both interior preferences for the 
developing firms and to the case in which the firms are partly (or fully) profit driven, with the profits being generated 
through the collection of licensing fees from the users. 
16 More generally, a binary vote is held between the newly developed project and the status quo, with the knowl-
edge that if the second firm endorsed the first project, it also terminated its development efforts. 
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 (iii) If  γ >  γ _ (ρ) , the equilibrium degree of compromise is strictly positive and 
weakly increasing in  γ and in  ρ .
 (iv) If the first project is removed from consideration upon a negative vote, there 
exists a unique  γ ∗ (ρ) ∈ ( γ _ (ρ) , 1) that induces the second-best projects.
 (v) If the first project is set aside until a runoff vote, the highest degree of equi-
librium compromise is given by the efficient-effort projects.
The supermajority requirement  γ plays a similar role to the Pareto weight  α in 
Proposition 2, with some important differences. Most strikingly, simple majority 
and small supermajority requirements are unable to induce any compromise. The 
pivotal voter knows that if the first project developed is rejected, the second project 
will be either fully selfish (if the former is eliminated), or only incrementally better 
than the first from her perspective (if a runoff is held). Hence, she votes in favor of 
the first project developed to avoid the costs of delay. This allows firms to pursue 
their favorite projects.17 Conversely, under the ex post optimal selection function, 
the first project must satisfy an agent (i.e., the other firm) who is willing to wait for a 
competing project. This forces each agent to offer a positive degree of compromise.
Thus, while a simple majority is effective at selecting among preexisting alter-
natives, it performs considerably worse in inducing the development of attractive 
projects. Indeed, the only ways to induce compromise under majority voting are to 
delay decisions until both projects are complete or to use a predetermined date on 
which all complete projects are put to a vote.18
As we increase the supermajority requirement  γ above  γ _ (ρ) , the pivotal voter 
becomes increasingly aligned with the firm that does not develop the first project. 
She is thus more willing to bear the cost of delay and both firms must offer a posi-
tive degree of compromise to induce immediate adoption. However, for sufficiently 
high  γ , the second firm becomes willing to halt its development efforts and endorse 
the first project. This may occur even if a voter who bears no cost of development 
prefers to wait for the second project.19
The voting procedure following rejection of the first project faces a similar trade-
off to the one identified in Propositions 1 and 2. If the first project is removed from 
further consideration, a negative vote gives the second firm free reign to develop 
and adopt its preferred project. The second firm is thus willing to cease its develop-
ment efforts if offered the maximum-compromise project described in Section IIIB. 
Additionally, because the level of compromise is monotonically increasing in  γ up 
to the maximum-compromise project, there exists an interior supermajority require-
ment that induces the second-best projects.
17 A simple majority rule is unable to induce mutual compromise even when the distribution of user types is 
asymmetric: if the median voter falls in an intermediate range, both firms pursue fully selfish projects; and if the 
median voter’s preferences are highly skewed, only the favored firm does. 
18 The fixed-date procedure is reminiscent of the policy contests in the models of Callander and Harstad (2015) 
and Hirsch and Shotts (2015). We examine this alternative procedure in the online Appendix, and we show that the 
outcome is less efficient than if players can vote upon completion of the first project. 
19 The threshold  γ ̅(ρ) at which this occurs depends on the procedure followed after the rejection of the first 
project. 
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If the first project is not eliminated, the second firm must develop a project that 
is preferred by a majority of the voters to win the runoff vote. Thus, firm  j develops 
project  x j = 1 −  x i as a competing project. Turning to the initial project choice, the 
equilibrium degree of compromise is increasing in  γ . However, for sufficiently high 
γ , the second firm endorses the same projects as under the ex post optimal selection 
function. Both firms then pursue the efficient-effort projects  x i E and the second-best 
projects are not attainable.
Therefore, inducing the second-best level of compromise requires both a 
 supermajority requirement and the threat of inefficient continuation if the first 
 project is rejected.
V. Discussion
We now discuss the robustness of our results to the main assumptions of our 
model. We begin with the role of quadratic effort costs, and then address other 
assumptions on the technology and the monitoring structure.
A. General Cost Functions
The quadratic cost function makes the analysis in Section II quite tractable. In 
particular, under symmetric projects, it yields the equilibrium effort levels and pay-
offs in closed form. This facilitates the subsequent analysis of specific selection 
functions and voting procedures. Throughout this subsection, we consider an arbi-
trary (strictly convex) cost of effort  c (a) , and we restrict attention to symmetric 
projects and to symmetric, stationary effort levels. In the online Appendix, we derive 
regularity conditions that guarantee existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in 
such strategies. We then show that our main results do not rely on a specific cost 
function.
The key observation is that, under any weighted-utilitarian selection function, 
each agent  i develops the best project that induces immediate acceptance by agent  j . 
Furthermore, the selection function alone determines the set of projects that agent 
j can develop as competing proposals. The cost function  c (a) only affects the level 
of agent  j ’s option value, which imposes bounds on his acceptance set. Thus, while 
the projects developed in equilibrium depend on the cost function quantitatively, the 
qualitative effect of the selection function on the equilibrium outcome is indepen-
dent of the cost of effort.
In particular, under the ex post optimal selection, each agent is indifferent 
between adopting the first project and developing its “mirror image” as a compet-
ing project. As explained in the proof of Proposition 1, this implies the first agent’s 
effort level imposes no externalities on the second agent, and both agents develop 
the efficient-effort projects regardless of the cost function. In fact, the same argu-
ment establishes that Proposition 1 holds as stated even if development costs  c (a, x) 
depend explicitly on the project chosen.
Furthermore, increasing the degree of compromise improves equilibrium pay-
offs unambiguously if effort levels are (weakly) above first best. This result holds 
quite generally: more compromise reduces effort and increases the total value of the 
projects developed, both of which improve welfare. Therefore, the ex post optimal 
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selection function yields insufficient compromise, and the optimal rule must favor 
later proposals.20
The comparative statics result for the optimal weights  α ∗ (ρ) in Proposition 2 
relies on closed-form expressions and on quadratic costs. While a more general ana-
lytical result seems out of reach, numerical examples suggest that the optimal degree 
of favoritism must increase as the agents become more impatient for a broader class 
of cost functions. In the online Appendix, we illustrate the case of power cost func-
tions,  c (a) =  a b /b , where  b > 1 .
The main results in our voting model (Proposition 3) can also be generalized 
quite easily. In particular, the impossibility of compromise under majority voting is 
driven only by the similarity in the preferences of the pivotal voter in each round. 
More generally, supermajority requirements create option value and induce equi-
librium compromise to the extent that they drive a wedge in the preferences of the 
pivotal voter across the voting rounds. Finally, the option value of blocking the 
first project is lower in the shadow of a runoff vote than when the first project can 
be eliminated. The runoff vote thus reduces the scope for equilibrium compromise 
independently of the specific cost function.
B. Disclosure, Switching Costs, Learning by Doing
Even though we have shown that the optimal selection function favors later pro-
posals, the observability assumption for complete projects does not affect our main 
results. In particular, the online Appendix establishes that the equilibrium under the 
optimal weight  α ∗ (ρ) is robust to allowing agents to verifiably but voluntarily dis-
close project completion. Thus, agents cannot exploit the degree of favoritism built 
into the optimal selection function by developing a more extreme project and then 
concealing it until the other agent has completed his project.
The model can also be extended to accommodate a fixed cost for switching proj-
ects. Switching costs limit the retaliatory ability of the second agent and reduce the 
option value of developing the second project. For sufficiently high costs, the second 
agent does not modify his project choice off the equilibrium path. In this case, the 
highest degree of compromise supported in equilibrium is given by the efficient-ef-
fort projects  x i E .
Finally, the logic of option values extends to nonstationary environments. For 
example, under learning by doing, the option value of the agent without a proj-
ect increases over time, and the optimal weight  α t ∗ (ρ) consequently increases. 
Conversely, if agents face a fixed deadline for adopting a project, the optimal 
weight  α t ∗ (ρ) decreases over time.
VI. Standard-Setting Organizations
The trade-offs described in our model parallel closely the challenges faced by 
SSOs. A fundamental problem in standards-setting is the public good nature of a 
20 If the cost of effort  c (a, x) depends on the project chosen, most of the results in Proposition 2 require imposing 
more structure on the problem. The main difficulty lies in the characterization of the second-best projects, which 
now depend on the specific cost function. 
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technological standard. Crafting proposed standards and participating in SSO pro-
cesses can be quite costly, creating incentives to free ride.21 To counter free-riding, 
SSOs rely on participating firms’ vested interests. Indeed, the value of a standard 
to a firm depends on its provisions: which patents it includes, what the licensing 
conditions are, and how compatible it is with each firm’s systems, to name a few. At 
the same time, however, solutions that disproportionately favor one firm are typi-
cally less effective (from a utilitarian perspective) than more integrated compromise 
solutions.22 Thus, compromise is efficient and desired by the SSO, but it may be 
challenging to achieve if participants have conflicting interests.
A. SSO Processes
SSOs vary significantly in their size, focus, and rules for participation and voting. 
The basic features of the process itself are, however, fairly common. First, a need for 
a standard is identified. Second, the relevant SSO forms a working group composed 
of member firm and organization representatives. The working group then reviews 
the existing technology and develops new solutions “with individual members often 
proposing specific alternatives based on their firm’s proprietary intellectual prop-
erty” Layne-Farrar and Padilla (2011). Finally, the members vote on the proposed 
options per the rules of the particular SSO.
Most working groups use Robert’s Rules of Order (Robert 2008) to govern their 
procedures, with special provisions added according to the circumstances. The votes 
on proposals are based on motions and are therefore taken sequentially. After a pro-
posal has been discussed, there is a motion to put that proposal to a vote. If the 
motion passes (generally requiring a vote in itself), a vote for endorsement takes 
place. Nearly every SSO requires a supermajority to qualify for “consensus” and, 
thus, for endorsement of the standard.23 Proposals that fail to meet the supermajor-
ity requirement after further debate are supposed to be removed from further con-
sideration. The process used by SSOs is thus qualitatively similar to the second-best 
voting mechanism discussed in Proposition 3.
While the basic process and the related challenges are relatively homogeneous, 
the SSOs differ in the more specific rules. These differences lie in the requirements 
that must be met for the acceptance of a standard, in their appeals and arbitration 
procedures, in the allocation of voting rights, and in how deadlocks and proposals 
that have failed to meet the supermajority requirement are treated.24 All of these 
21 Formulating a proposal may require research and development of a new technology or combining multiple 
existing technologies (not all of which are proprietary) into a well-functioning solution. The administrative costs 
of participating in the standardization process can also be substantial. Weiss and Toyofuku (1996) study free-
rider problems in the development of the 10BaseT Ethernet standard in the IEEE, uncovering a large number of 
 noncontributing members. 
22 Consistent with this view, Lehr (1992) notes that “a firm may find it profitable to promote a standard which 
promises to increase its market share even if total surplus declines. Those who benefit from standards do not always 
bear the full costs of adoption. For example, new component manufacturers who may benefit from lower entry costs 
may fail to share the switching costs faced by incumbent firms and their customers.” 
23 The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) defines consensus as “general agreement, but not neces-
sarily unanimity, [with] a process for attempting to resolve objections by interested parties.” 
24 The data in Baron and Spulber (2015) provide an overview of some of the above dimensions. Of the 36 SSOs 
they surveyed, 11 operate under majority and 10 under unanimity rules; supermajority requirements range from 66 
percent to 75 percent, including or excluding abstentions. All SSOs attempt to induce consensus by requiring neg-
ative votes to be accompanied by detailed motivations. Finally, some SSOs have specific rules for participation that 
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dimensions influence which projects are proposed and eventually endorsed by the 
SSO. In Table 1, we summarize the approval requirements and tie-breaking proce-
dures for each SSO we mention in the paper.25
B. SSO Experiences
The actual experiences of SSOs reflect the main themes of our model. First, the 
option value of blocking a project determines the required degree of compromise 
in the proposed standards. Second, SSOs face a trade-off between ex post optimal 
project selection and ex ante incentives for compromise. Below, we articulate these 
themes further.
Remark 1: Supermajority requirements are able to induce substantive compro-
mise when competing parties do not yet have working and ready-to-market solutions. 
Conversely, when a technology is mature, compromise becomes more difficult.
When a technology is new and the cost of developing a project is high, a suffi-
ciently balanced proposal can receive support from other members and lead to a 
relatively rapid adoption of a standard. The case of Local Area Networks (LANs) 
provides a good example. The IEEE began to standardize LANs in 1980. Xerox 
offered an open networking standard to convince computer manufacturers to adopt 
the Ethernet interface for their printers. The support of 3Com, Digital, and Intel 
convinced IEEE working group 802 to adopt Ethernet as an open standard in 1982 
(Shapiro and Varian 1999). Similarly, Lucent and Intersil proposed a compromise 
standard for first-generation wireless networks (WLANs) in 1999, which was 
quickly adopted by the IEEE as standard 802.11b. In both examples, the initiator 
offered enough compromise to gain sufficient support and preempt the development 
of alternatives.26
limit the number of representatives (or votes) from any given firm or interest group. See Yates and Murphy (2015) 
for a discussion of the balance requirement in standards bodies. 
25 To the best of our knowledge, the only studies to systematically examine variation across SSO rules are 
Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole (2007) and Baron and Spulber (2015). For more details on the adoption processes, includ-
ing quorum requirements and appeals, see Table 4 in Baron and Spulber (2015). 
26 A supermajority requirement is also able to block single proposals that do not offer sufficient compromise. A 
recent example is provided by the W3C’s Tracking Protection Group. The only proposal for a “Do Not Track” stan-
dard that has been voted on so far was presented by the Digital Advertising Alliance (an industry association). The 
proposal was mostly silent on data collection, regulating only its use for targeted advertising. Due to the opposition 
of consumer protection groups, the proposal was voted down in 2013, forcing the group to look for a new solution. 
Table 1—SSO Policies
SSO Link to procedures Approval Tiebreaking rule
IEEE https://standards.ieee.org/develop/process.html 75 percent majority Group-level rules
IETF http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2026.txt Rough consensus Chair discretion
W3C http://www.w3.org/2014/Process-20140801/ Consensus Chair may call vote
ETSI https://portal.etsi.org/Resources/ETSIDirectives.aspx 71 percent majority Weighted voting
INCITS http://www.incits.org/standards-information/policies 66 percent majority N/A
Note: All URLs were last accessed on November 23, 2015.
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Once the WLAN technology matured and firms developed advanced proprietary 
solutions, such preemption became more difficult, and negotiations over multiple 
standard proposals became a reality. In 2001, the negotiations over the 802.11g stan-
dard witnessed a standoff between two proposals, neither of which was able to gain 
the 75 percent majority required for acceptance. The resulting stalemate led to the 
de facto adoption of multiple standards.27
Indeed, the risk of deadlocks in the future lowers the option value of blocking 
initial proposals, and that can allow parties to exploit the fear of deadlock to pursue 
more selfish projects. For instance, during the negotiations for the 802.11n standard 
in 2006, the process stalled again. In this case, DeLacey et al. (2006) describe how 
“a group of influential semiconductor companies formed a third group, taking on 
the name Enhanced Wireless Consortium (EWC) […] they banded together and 
began promoting their own specifications for the standard, working outside IEEE 
approval.” Given this pressure, the IEEE adopted the EWC’s draft specification in 
2007 with very few concessions.28
Remark 2: In practice, devising rules for breaking deadlocks is an important 
aspect of SSO procedures. These rules must balance the benefits of a supermajority 
requirement in inducing ex ante compromise and the risks of ex post impasse and 
delay.
Delays in calling a vote, private information, and other exogenous elements can 
cause multiple projects to be completed prior to any vote. As seen above, in such 
cases a supermajority requirement can lead to a deadlock, the risk of which can 
reduce the equilibrium degree of compromise. Intuitive solutions to break a dead-
lock consist of turning to an impartial mediator, or having a runoff vote between any 
remaining candidates to determine the final choice. For example, in the IETF, the 
Working Group chair is charged with establishing whether “rough consensus” has 
been achieved, and in the W3C, the chair has the power to call a majority vote to 
break the deadlock.29
An alternative is to introduce more elaborate voting rules for resolving deadlock. 
These rules are often the objects of contentious negotiations prior to commenc-
ing work on a given standard. For instance, during the negotiations over the IEEE 
802.11g standard, the chair formulated detailed selection criteria, including a “down 
vote” to eliminate multiple proposals: “Rounds of voting will be held that succes-
sively eliminate one candidate proposal at a time. On each round of voting, the 
candidate proposal that receives the least number of votes shall be eliminated from 
consideration.”
The key tension faced by the selection criteria is that (following Proposition 3) 
ex post optimal selection, such as achieved through a runoff vote or mediator, may 
27 DeLacey et al. (2006, p. 12) note that “As the 802.11g standard was being developed, several companies 
began producing pre-11g devices that did not interoperate effectively.” 
28 Layne-Farrar and Padilla (2011, p. 23) describe how “this outside group, a sort of hybrid de facto/cooperative 
alliance, forced IEEE’s hand and a consensus standard that combined the breakout group’s proposal with elements 
of the proposal that had bogged down in IEEE committee finally emerged through the SSO.” 
29 Further, since the IETF is somewhat unique in that it has no formal votes, determining rough consensus 
almost always falls on the Working Group chair. 
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induce insufficient compromise. Instead, achieving sufficient compromise can 
require even good proposals to be eliminated from consideration following a failure 
to garner sufficient support. The requirement of such ex post value burning leads us 
to our final remark.
Remark 3: All selection criteria face the challenge of credibly and permanently 
removing failed projects from consideration.
Proposed standards that are voted down are, in fact, often eliminated from 
consideration, sometimes even leading the SSO to disband a working group.30 
Nevertheless, eliminating a proposal in the absence of a clearly superior alternative 
is difficult for several reasons.
First, the actual implementation of any selection procedure is often contentious. 
Indeed, the deadlock in the 802.11g negotiations essentially resulted from the inter-
pretation of the down vote, whereby the chair insisted on the elimination of any 
proposal that failed to meet the 75 percent requirement (leading to rejection of all 
proposals), while Intersil (the majority proposal) argued that the last vote should be 
between the last remaining proposal and “doing nothing” (Liu 2001). Indeed, the 
latter solution is optimal ex post, but the approach of the chair could be necessary 
for inducing sufficient compromise in the project choices themselves.
Second not approving a standard is rarely a realistic outcome: upon prolonged 
disagreement, earlier proposals might be brought back to the table. Lehr (1996) 
describes the case the ANSI-accredited X3 committee (now INCITS), where a sim-
ple majority was required to discuss and vote on a working document. In 1987, IBM 
was able to delay the proceedings on the Fiber Distributed Data Interface (FDDI) by 
repeatedly submitting alternative proposals that contained minor design differences 
from the leading project.31
Third, a better technology can be reintroduced by other means, whether in another 
SSO (“forum shopping”) or into the market directly. For example, as the process for 
802.11n stalled, Eisenmann and Barley (2006) suggest that the trade association 
Wi-Fi Alliance emerged as a competing de facto standards body, marketing partial 
solutions such as 802.11i and 802.11e, prior to the approval of an IEEE standard.32 
Again, the ability to circumvent the supermajority requirement is valuable to limit 
ex post inefficiencies in the implementation of a standard, but inhibits compromise 
in the standards pursued in the first place.
C. Discussion
We have explicitly focused on a particular aspect of SSOs, namely the effect of 
the technological environment and the rules and bylaws on the types of proposal 
brought fore by the participants. There are, of course, several aspects of SSOs that 
30 This was the case, for example, of the IEEE’s group for Ultra Wide Band standards in 2006. 
31 The committee eventually approved the leading proposal and modified its rules by introducing a 
two-thirds supermajority requirement to reopen a discussion (Architecture Technology Corporation 1991). 
32 Similarly, in June 2004, a web standards proposal by Mozilla and Opera was turned down by the W3C. They 
subsequently formed the Web Hypertext Application Technology Working Group (WHATWG). In 2007, they con-
vinced the W3C to adopt WHATWG’s Web Forms 2.0 as part of the HTML standard. 
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our model does not capture. Even if projects are not contractible, ex post payments 
are realistic in SSOs for at least two reasons. Quite literally, the payoff from any 
technological proposal can be amended by bargaining over the licensing terms. 
More importantly, many SSO members interact repeatedly in the same industry. 
Thus, logrolling multiple standards negotiations effectively forms a repeated-game 
(relational) transfer. In the working paper, we examine the possibility of agents 
offering payments in exchange for support for their projects.
We also adopt a reduced-form approach toward many of the institutional details 
that address ex post opportunism. These include disclosure requirements for stan-
dard-essential patents33 as well as the extent and nature of licensing commitments 
regarding the intellectual property incorporated into the standard.34 We do not com-
pare the choice of technology in market-based versus committee-based standardiza-
tion, which is the focus of Farrell and Saloner (1988) and Llanes and Poblete (2015). 
Finally, we abstract from competition among standards bodies and the related issue 
of “forum shopping” Lerner and Tirole (2006).
VII. Conclusions
We have analyzed a collective decision-making problem in which members of 
an organization develop projects and negotiate over adoption decisions. When the 
agents have conflicting preferences over the outcomes, a key trade-off emerges 
between the total value of the projects they pursue and the incentives to exert effort 
toward their development. The agents’ expectations over future negotiations influ-
ence the specific projects pursued. An agreement to adopt the more socially efficient 
project induces insufficient compromise. The second-best combination of compro-
mise and effort levels can be achieved in equilibrium, provided that the selection 
criterion favors later projects, or that the organization adopts supermajority voting 
rules and discards failed proposals.
At a broader level, our paper relates to the organization of research and devel-
opment efforts. An intuitive approach suggests letting “a thousand flowers bloom” 
prior to adopting a project. In contrast, we have shown that when project choice is 
endogenous, a dynamic model of decision-making can yield an ex ante efficient out-
come by utilizing the preemption motive, even in the absence of any costs of discern-
ing among completed projects. However, our model is quite stylized. Introducing 
a stochastic element to project quality leads to sequential sampling, which makes 
adopting the first complete project unlikely to be optimal. Similarly, additional 
information is often learned during the development process, creating benefits to 
collecting multiple projects before making a final selection. The benefits of dynamic 
competition are, however, likely to remain even in models with a richer structure, 
and examining the optimal termination of alternative projects in such richer environ-
ments is a promising avenue of further research.
33 Ganglmair and Tarantino (2014) study the incentives to conceal a standard-essential patent from the SSO to 
subsequently hold up other members. 
34 Some consortia (e.g., W3C) require ex ante commitment to royalty-free licensing, as opposed to the more 
common and vague requirement of ex post “reasonable and non-discriminatory” licensing terms. See Lemley 
(2002) and Layne-Farrar and Padilla (2011) for details on intellectual property in SSOs. 
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Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
We begin by establishing some properties of the second-best projects  ( x 1 ∗ ,  x 2 ∗) . 
Under symmetric effort levels, each agent’s equilibrium payoff is given by (up to a 
multiplicative constant)
(10)  V (a (v) , v) ∝ 2v + ϕ (v) + ρ −  √ __  (v − ϕ (v) − ρ) 2 + 6ρv . 
We then maximize (10) with respect to  v . The first-order condition yields the inverse 
function  ρ ∗ (v) that characterizes the second-best projects:
(11)  ρ ∗ (v) = − 1 + 2ϕ′ (v)   _________ 
2 (2 + ϕ′ (v) )   
 (v − ϕ (v) ) 2   ____________  
v + ϕ (v) + vϕ (v) . 
Note that (11) implies  v ∗ (0) = ϕ ( v ∗ (0)) , i.e.,  x i ∗ (0) = 1/2 . Therefore, 
 ϕ′ ( v ∗ (ρ) ) → − 1 as  ρ → 0 . For small enough  ρ , we then have  ϕ′ ( v ∗ (ρ) ) > − 2 
and  v + ϕ (v) + vϕ′ (v) > 0 . As  v increases, both terms in the numerator increase in 
absolute value, and both terms in the denominator decrease (because  ϕ′ (v) < − 1 ). 
Therefore,  ρ ∗ (v) is strictly increasing in  v . Hence, the value of the  second-best 
 projects  v ∗ (ρ) is given by the unique solution to the equation  ρ E (v) = ρ . 
Moreover,  ρ ∗ (v) grows without bound as  v approaches the root of  v + ϕ (v) + 
vϕ′ (v) , which is itself bounded away from 1. Thus,  v ∗ (ρ) satisfies  2 + ϕ′ ( v ∗ ) 
>   v ∗ + ϕ ( v ∗ ) +  v ∗ ϕ′ ( v ∗ ) > 0 for all  ρ ≥ 0 .
We now consider the maximum-compromise projects  (  x ̅1 ,  x ̅2 ) . Using the defini-
tion of  u (w) , these projects satisfy
(12)  ϕ ( v ̅) = 1 + ρ −  √ _ ρ 2 + 2ρ . 
Solving (12) for  ρ we obtain the inverse function
(13)  ρ ̅(v) =   (1 − ϕ (v) ) 
2  _
2ϕ (v)  . 
Both  ρ ∗ (v) and  ρ ̅(v) are strictly increasing in  v , where  v ∗ (0) >  v ̅(0) = 0 . Below, 
we establish that the ratio  ρ ∗ (v) / ρ ̅(v) is increasing and, hence, that  ρ ̅(v) crosses 
 ρ ∗ (v) only once (from above). Therefore, we have  v ∗ (ρ) >  v ̅(ρ) for  ρ ∈  [0,  ρ ̅] . The 
threshold  ρ ̅ is the unique level for which  ρ ∗ (v) =  ρ ̅(v) . Inversely, for  ρ >  ρ ̅ , the 
maximum-compromise projects are more polarized than the second-best projects, 
i.e.,  v ∗ (ρ) <  v ̅(ρ) .
The ratio  ρ ∗ (v) / ρ ̅(v) can be written as
  
 ρ ∗ (v)  _ ρ ̅(v)  = − 
1 + 2ϕ′ (v)  ________
2 + ϕ′ (v)    
ϕ (v) ____________  
v + ϕ (v) + vϕ′ (v)   
 (v − ϕ (v) ) 2   (1 − ϕ (v) ) 2 . 
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Because the last term is strictly increasing in  v , denote the product of the first two 
terms as
(14)  z (v) := − 1 + 2ϕ′ (v)  ________
2 + ϕ′ (v)    
ϕ (v) ____________  
v + ϕ (v) + vϕ′ (v) . 
We show that  z  is strictly increasing. Indeed, we have
     z′ (v) =   (ϕ′(v)  + 1)  (2ϕ′(v)  + 1)  (ϕ(v)  − vϕ′(v))     ____________________________   (ϕ′(v)  + 2)  (vϕ′(v)  + ϕ(v)  + v) 2  
 −  ϕ(v) (3ϕ(v)  + v − 2 (ϕ′(v)  + 1) ϕ′(v) v) ϕ″(v)    _______________________________   (ϕ′(v)  + 2) 2  (vϕ′(v )  + ϕ(v)  + v) 2  . 
Because  v + ϕ (v) + vϕ′ (v) > 0 , we know that  v + 3ϕ(v) − 2vϕ′(v) (ϕ′(v) + 1) > 0 
and, therefore,  z′ (v) > 0 . This implies that the ratio  ρ ∗ (v) / ρ ̅(v) is strictly increasing.
 (i) Consider the selection function  ξ (x, τ, α) . Let  x 1 be the first project devel-
oped, where  v 1 ( x 1 ) = v . Agent  2 can adopt  x 1 or develop a competing project 
worth  w such that
(15)  (1 − α) w + αϕ (w) ≥  (1 − α) ϕ (v) + αv. 
  Let  w (v, α) = min {1,  w ̂ } , where  w ̂ denotes the largest solution to (15) hold-
ing with equality. The value to agent  2 of developing the second project 
is given by  u (w (v, α) ) . Therefore, agent  2 adopts project  x 1 if and only if 
 ϕ (v) ≥ u (w (v, α) ) . 
   On the equilibrium path,  w (v, α) is increasing in  v . First, the right-hand 
side of (15) is decreasing in  v : suppose that agent  1 chooses a project  v 
for which  (1 − α) ϕ (v) + αv is increasing; agent 2 would adopt it because 
 w (v, α) = ϕ (v) ; agent 1 could then increase his payoff  v and still induce 
agent  2 to adopt his project. Second, the left-hand side of (15) is decreasing 
in  w because agent  2 ’s choice of second project maximizes his payoff sub-
ject to (15). Therefore, agent  2 adopts agent  1 ’s project if  v is sufficiently 
low. Agent  1 ’s payoff is then increasing in  v as long as agent  2 adopts it, but 
decreasing in  v if he does not. Therefore, the constraint (15) binds on the 
equilibrium path, and the first project developed is adopted.
 (ii) Each agent pursues a project  x i (α, ρ) with value  v i ( x i (α, ρ) ) = v such that
(16)  ϕ (v) = u (w (v, α) , ρ) . 
  We now show that  v i ( x i (α, ρ) ) is increasing in  α . Suppose instead that  α 
increases and  v i ( x i (α, ρ) ) decreases. Because  v i ( x i (α, ρ) ) satisfies (16) and (15) holds with equality, this means that  w (v, α) must decrease, but then, the 
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left-hand side of (16) increases while the right-hand side (which depends on 
α only through  w ) decreases, yielding a contradiction. A similar argument 
establishes that  v i ( x i (α, ρ) )  is increasing in  ρ .
 (iii) The threshold  α ̅ (ρ) satisfies the condition
  1 − α =  (1 − α) ϕ ( v ̅) + α v ̅. 
  Because the frontier  ϕ (v) is symmetric, solving for  α yields
  α ̅ (ρ) =   √ 
_ ρ 2 + 2ρ − ρ   ____________________________    √  ρ 2 + 2ρ − ρ + ϕ(1 + ρ −  √  ρ 2 + 2ρ ) , 
  which is increasing in  ρ . Furthermore, if we let  x := 1 + ρ −  √ _ ρ 2 + 2ρ , we 
obtain
  α ̅ (x) =  1 − x _ 1 − x + ϕ(x) ≤  1 _2 . 
 (iv) Let  v ∗ (ρ) denote the value of the second-best project  v i ( x i ∗ (ρ)) . The optimal 
weight  α ∗ (ρ) satisfies the following equation
  (1 − α) w ( v ∗ (ρ) , α) + αϕ (w ( v ∗ (ρ) , α) ) =  (1 − α) ϕ ( v ∗ (ρ) ) + α  v ∗ (ρ) , 
  where
  w ( v ∗ (ρ) , α) + ρ −  √ __  ρ 2 + 2ρw( v ∗ (ρ) , α) = φ ( v ∗ (ρ) ) . 
We know from the proof of Proposition 1 that  v i ( x i (1 / 2, ρ) ) =  v E (ρ) and from 
the previous argument that  v E (ρ) ≥  v ∗ (ρ) ≥  v ̅(ρ) for all  ρ ∈  [0,  ρ ̅] . Finally, 
because we know from part (ii) that  v i ( x i (α, ρ) ) is increasing in  α , we conclude that 
 α ∗ (ρ) ∈  [ α ̅ (ρ) , 1 / 2] . It then follows by construction that  α ∗ ( ρ ̅) = α ( ρ ̅) .
To show that the optimal weight  α ∗ (ρ) is decreasing in  ρ , we rewrite the two 
conditions for the optimal weight  α ∗ (ρ) as
(17)  (1 − α) w (v) + αϕ (w (v) ) =  (1 − α) ϕ (v) + αv, 
  w ∗ (v) = ϕ (v) +  √ _  2  ρ ∗ (v) ϕ (v) . 
We then consider the two functions
  ρ (α, v) =   (w (v, α) − ϕ (v) ) 
2   _____________ 
2ϕ (v) 
and
  ρ ∗ (v) =   ( w ∗ (v) − ϕ (v) ) 
2   ____________
2ϕ (v)  , 
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where  w (v, α) is given in (15) and  w ∗ (v) in (17). Because  w (v, α) is decreasing in 
α , so is  ρ (α, v) . Thus, both  ρ ∗ (v) and  ρ (v, α) are increasing in  v . We now show that 
 ρ ∗ (v) crosses  ρ (α, v) only from below, i.e., if  v satisfies  ρ ∗ (v) = ρ (v, α) , then it 
must hold that
(18)  d  w 
∗ (v)  _
dv
 >  ∂ w (v, α)  _∂ v . 
To show this, totally differentiate condition (15), and let  β  := α / (1 − α) . We 
obtain
  
∂ w (v, α)  _∂ v =  
ϕ′ (v) + β ________βϕ′ (w) + 1 . 
Notice that as  ρ → 0 ,  w (v) → ϕ (v) and  ϕ′ (v) → − β. Because the frontier  ϕ is 
symmetric, it holds that  ϕ′ (ϕ (v) ) = 1 /ϕ′ (v) and, therefore,
  lim ϕ′ (v) →−β 
    ∂ w (v, α)  _∂ v = − ϕ′ (v) . 
Because  w (v) ≥ ϕ (v) , we can bound the right-hand side of (18) as
  
∂ w (v, α)  _∂ v ≤ − ϕ′ (v) . 
Now consider the value  w ∗ (v) ; substitute the definition of  ρ ∗ (v) from (11) into (17); 
and obtain
  
d  w ∗ (v)  _
dv
 = ϕ′ (v) +  (1 − ϕ′ (v) )  √ _ z (v) +  (v − ϕ (v) )   z′ (v)  ______ 
2  √  z (v) , 
where  z (v) is defined in (14). Because  z is strictly increasing, it suffices to show that
(19)  2ϕ′ (v) +  (1 − ϕ′ (v) )  √ _ z (v) ≥ 0. 
Recall the definition of  z (v) in (14); define  c  := ϕ (v) / v and  x  := ϕ′ (v) 
∈  [− 1 − c,  − 1] ; and consider the function
  C (x)  := 2x +  (1 − x)  √ __  − 1 + 2x _2 + x  c 1 + c + x . 
Because  C (− 1) = 0 and  C′ (x) < 0 if  C (x) = 0 , we have  C (x) ≥ 0 , which 
implies that the left-hand side of (19) is strictly positive, and that (18) is 
satisfied.  ∎ 
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